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31 Introduction
In 1962 David Gale and Lloyd Shapley published the seminal article ￿College Ad-
missions and the Stability of Marriage￿ , where they de￿ned and discussed the stable
marriage, college admissions, and stable roommates problems. They showed that
for all instances (i.e. for any preference pro￿le) of the stable marriage or the college
admissions problems there is at least one stable matching, but that is not the case
for the roommates problem.
This paper revisits the roommates problem. There are an even number of male
students to be matched. We prove that preferences are acyclic if and only if they are
representable by symmetric utilities, i.e. by symmetric functions u(￿;￿) : A￿A ! R,
where u(i;j) is the utility of agent i 2 A when he matched with j 2 A. Symmetric
utilities mean that for any i and j, agent i￿ s utility when matched with j is the
same as j￿ s utility when matched with i.1 One possible interpretation for symmetric
utilities is that they come from the production of some concrete good (or numeraire).
This is a reasonable way to model many situations in economics, so our symmetry
condition sheds new light on this old problem. For an example where acyclicity
arises naturally, consider the case when everybody agrees on the relative order of all
agents, except possibly for themselves.
Why are we interested in acyclicity? Instances of the roommates problem that
contain no cycle of odd size will always have at least one stable matching. Acyclic
instances, with neither odd nor even size cycles, have a unique stable matching.2
Irving (1985) was the ￿rst to describe an algorithm that tells when a given
instance of the roommates problem has a stable matching. Acyclicity is strictly
stronger than Chung￿ s (2000) ￿no odd rings￿ condition, which itself is strictly
stronger than Tan￿ s (1991) necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of
1The proofs here do not make use of the traditional deference-acceptance algorithm created by
Gale and Shapley.
2Chung (2000) proved that instances with no odd cycles have at least one stable matching. On
the other hand, a standard argument says that if there were two distinct stable matchings then a
even cycle could be constructed. Therefore, if there are no cycles at all, we have the existence and
uniqueness result. I thank a referee for pointing this out.
4a stable matching.3 Under our stronger hypothesis, one has the advantage of having
uniqueness and a simple procedure to ￿nd the stable matching.4 The price for this
additional structure is the loss in generality; the bene￿t is greater intuition and a
sharper prediction of the outcome.
2 The Roommates Model
Let n be a strictly positive integer. Let A = f1;2;￿￿￿ ;ng be the set of agents in
a given population. It will be assumed that each agent i 2 A has his own (strict)
preferences, denoted ￿
i
, about his potential partners. Formally, ￿
i
is a complete,
anti-symmetric and transitive relation over the set A.
A matching is any function ￿ : A ￿! A such that 8i 2 A, i = ￿(￿(i)). The
interpretation is that ￿(i) represents the partner (or match) of agent i, according to
the matching ￿. An agent i is said to be alone if and only if i = ￿(i).
Agent i is said to block matching ￿ if he prefers to be alone rather than to be
matched with his current partner ￿(i). Formally, i ￿
i
￿(i). A pair of distinct agents
i, j, not matched with each other under the matching ￿, is said to block ￿ if i
prefers j to his current match ￿(i), and j prefers i to his current partner ￿(j), that
is: j ￿
i
￿(i) and i ￿
j
￿(j). A matching is stable if it is not blocked (neither by a
single agent, nor by a pair of distinct agents).5
An instance = of the stable roommates problem is characterized by a speci￿c






; ￿￿￿ ; ￿
n
￿
. The stable roommates problem (or
just the roommates problem) is to ￿nd a stable matching in a given instance. A
3Our study is related to Chung (2000). He has a similar (but weaker) condition on preferences,
named ￿no odd rings￿ , that is su¢ cient for the existence of a stable matching. However, he does not
provide a representation result. He is also not concerned about the uniqueness of stable matching
assignments. On the other hand, he is able to work in a more general framework, by considering
weak preferences (here all preferences are strict). Finally, Chung presents some applications to
social choice that we will not cover.
4Under acyclic preferences there is simple algorithm to ￿nd the unique stable matching. Let
(i;j) 2 argmaxfu(i;j)j (i;j) 2 A ￿ Ag. Match i with j and remove them from the population.
Then repeat the procedure with the remaining population. Because A is ￿nite this procedures
eventually ends, and it is easy to verify that it generates the unique stable matching.
5The concept of stability coincides with the concept of core (by de￿nition a matching is in the
core if and only if there is no blocking coalition of any size).
5particular instance = is said to be a stable if the corresponding roommates problem
has at least one solution, that is, if there is at least one stable matching. Otherwise
= is said to be an unstable instance. It is well known that there are stable and
unstable instances.
The existence of cycles is a key element to the study of stability. A cycle of size
k is an ordered subset of agents (i(1);i(2);￿￿￿ ;i(k)), with k ￿ 3 and i(j) 6= i(j +1),










A cycle is said to be even (odd) if and only if k is even (odd). An instance of the
roommates problem that has no cycle is called acyclic (equivalently we refer to
acyclic preferences).
Example 1 Figures 1 and 2 show respectively cycles of size six and ￿ve. An arrow
numbered x from box i to box j means that agent x prefers to be matched with j than
with i, that is, i ￿
x
j. One may observe that cycles of even size are represented by
graphs with two connected components, but cycles of odd size have a representation
with only one connected component.
Figure 1: cycle (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).

























6Figure 2: cycle (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Acyclic instances of the roommates problem will always have a unique stable
matching.
3 Representation of Acyclic Preferences
Now we will study a class of utility functions that represent acyclic preferences. Let
u(￿;￿) : A2 ! R be a function with the interpretation that u(i;j) is the utility of
agent i when he is matched with agent j. This function represents agents￿preferences
if and only if u(i;j) < u(i;l) , j ￿
i
l, 8i;j;l 2 A. One may always represent the
preferences of the agents by some utility function because the population A is ￿nite.
Moreover, if h : R ! R is any strictly increasing function then h(u(￿;￿)) : A2 ! R
also represents the same preferences.
An instance of the roommates problem is said to satisfy the symmetric utilities
hypothesis if there exist a symmetric function u(￿;￿) : A2 ! R representing agents￿
preferences, that is, u(i;j) = u(j;i), 8 i;j 2 A. As an example of symmetric utilities,
one can image a set A of risk neutral salespersons that work in pairs or alone. The
utility of vendors forming a match is the expected commission they will make (and
share in equal parts) by working together. The symmetric utilities hypothesis says
that vendors have the same sales expectations about working together.
The symmetric utility hypothesis restricts the feasible instances of the roommates
problem. For instance, if we consider three agents, A = f1;2;3g, with preferences




1, and 1 ￿
3
2 then it is not possible to have symmetric
utilities representing preferences. Suppose to the contrary they do. Then, 2 ￿
1
3 )
u(1;2) < u(1;3); 3 ￿
2
1 ) u(2;3) < u(2;1); and 1 ￿
3
2 ) u(3;1) < u(3;2), but this
7is not possible under the symmetric utility hypothesis, because u(1;2) < u(1;3) =
u(3;1) < u(3;2) = u(2;3) < u(2;1) = u(1;2) is clearly a contradiction.
Next, we show that acyclic preferences correspond to instances that admit sym-
metric utilities and vice-versa.
Proposition 1 (Representing Acyclic Preferences with Symmetric Utilities)
(i) If an instance = of the roommates problem has acyclic preferences then there
exist symmetric utility functions u(￿;￿) : A2 ! R, representing the agents￿prefer-
ences, i.e. = satis￿es the symmetric utility hypothesis. (ii) Conversely, if agents￿
preferences given by an instance = can be represented by symmetric utility functions
u(￿;￿) : A2 ! R, then = is acyclic.
Proof. (i) Some additional notation is needed. De￿ne the relation ￿ in A2 by:
(i;j) ￿ (k;l) , (i;j) = (k;l) or (i;j) = (l;k). The relation ￿ is an equivalence6
relation on the set A2.
We provide a quotient structure on A2. Let [(i;j)] = f(k;l) 2 A2 j (k;l) ￿ (i;j)g.
Let A2=￿ denote the set of equivalence classes, that is, A2=￿ = f[(i;j)]j(i;j) 2 A2g.
The set A2=￿ is similar to the Cartesian product A2. The only di⁄erence is that in
A2=￿ the relative order of the coordinates does not matter. A typical element of
A2=￿ will be called a point and denoted by [i;j].
A path connects [i;j] to [k;l] if for some integer p ￿ 1 there is a ￿nite se-
quence of points [i;j] = [x0;y0], [x1;y1], [x2;y2], ￿￿￿, [xp;yp] = [k;l], such that 8s 2
f0;1;￿￿￿ ;p ￿ 1g we have
￿











The point [i;j] = [x0;y0] is called the beginning of the path, and [k;l] = [xp;yp] is
called its end point. A relation (which turns out to be a partial strict order) < can
then be de￿ned in A2=￿ by: [i;j] < [k;l] if and only if there exists path connecting
[i;j] to [k;l].
It should be observed that the composition of two paths is still a path whenever
the end point of one coincides with the beginning of the other. This means that
6Re￿ exive, symmetric and transitive.
8the relation < is transitive. We show that it is a partial strict order, for which it is
enough to show that < is irre￿ exive.
A path is said to be closed if and only if its beginning point and its end point
coincide. If xs = xs+1, ys ￿
xs
ys+1, ys+1 = ys+2 and xs+1 ￿
ys+1
xs+2 then we say that
the path changes its base point at [xs+1;ys+1]. If there exists any closed path,
then we can obtain a cycle by looking at the path points that changed their base.
In other words, from any closed path we can extract a cycle. But by assumption
there is no cycle. Therefore, there are no closed paths in acyclic instances. This
means that the relation < is irre￿ exive. Hence, this relation is a partial strict order
in A2=￿. The weak order ￿ is de￿ned as usual: [i;j] ￿ [k;l] , [i;j] < [k;l], or
[i;j] = [k;l].
Given an acyclic instance = of the roommates problem, we consider a Hasse
diagram of the associated ordered set, drawn on a cartesian plane.7 Then, we de￿ne
￿(i;j) = u(i;j) = u(j;i) to be the vertical coordinate of [i;j] in the diagram. If
there is a path connecting [i;j] to [k;l] then [i;j] < [k;l] and this implies that
￿(i;j) < ￿(k;l).
Now ￿x agents i, j and l. Then, ￿(i;j) < ￿(i;l) if and only if there is a path
[i;j(1)], [i;j(2)], ￿￿￿, [i;j(k)], with k ￿ 2, such that j = j(1) and j(k) = l. But that
is the case if and only if




j(3); ￿￿￿ ; j(k ￿ 1) ￿
i
j(k) = l (1)
which means that j ￿
i
l. Conversely, if j ￿
i
l, (1) holds and then ￿(i;j) < ￿(i;l).
So, ￿ is symmetric and represents the agents￿preferences. This proves this result.
One may note that there may exist some room for arbitrariness in the assignment
of the locations (values) of our ￿(i;j). That is not a problem; it re￿ ects the fact
that the representation is not unique.
7See Davey and Priestley (2002) for details on ordered sets and Hasse diagrams. In particular,
see Lemma 1.17 and Proposition 1.18. Alternatively, we could complete this proof by de￿ning
B = A2=￿, and assigning consecutive integer values for the utilities of random draws among
minimal points of B. After each assignment, the corresponding point would be removed from B.
This potentially creates new minimal points of the remaining partially ordered set. Because A2=￿
has ￿nite elements, our procedure ends.
9(ii) Let = be a ￿xed instance of the roommates problem such that there are utility
functions u(￿;￿) : A2 ! R, representing agents preferences in =, with u(i;j) = u(j;i),
8i;j 2 A. Suppose that acyclicity does not hold. So, there will exist a cycle





i(3);￿￿￿; i(k ￿ 2) ￿
i(k￿1)




u(i(1);i(k)) < u(i(1);i(2)) = u(i(2);i(1)) < u(i(2);i(3)) = u(i(3);i(2)) < ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ < u(i(k ￿ 1);i(k)) = u(i(k);i(k ￿ 1)) < u(i(k);i(1)) = u(i(1);i(k))
The equalities hold by the assumption of symmetric utilities. But u(i(1);i(k)) <
u(i(1);i(k)) is obviously a contradiction, proving part (ii) of this proposition.
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